A Model of Morality

One of the most important questions in religious debates and discussions is whether morality truly exists. Indeed, the Moral Argument for God’s existence depends on it as one of its premises. The problem is that there is a great deal of confusion around what the various terms mean: Can morality be subjective? What is included in morality and what is not? Are imperatives built into reality (i.e., is morality normative)? And most importantly, perhaps, what does it even mean for morality to exist?

Introduction

Rather than starting at the beginning, let us jump straight into the middle with a central question: What does ‘good’ mean in a moral context? Terms such as good and bad, right and wrong, or moral and immoral carry different meanings depending on the context. Getting the correct answer on a test may be ‘good’ in a prudential or instrumental sense, but that is not the sense relevant to morality.

In its simplest and most common form, moral judgment concerns human interactions and their consequences, particularly those involving harm, benefit, fairness, or cooperation. Yet the scope of morality is contested and can extend further. Is masturbation morally bad, or is it merely a private matter outside morality's domain? What about necrophilia? Does our treatment of animals, even pets or livestock, fall under moral scrutiny, or is it limited to human welfare? Should we all be vegetarians or vegans on moral grounds? What about responsibilities toward all life (flora and fauna) or the planet itself? Different traditions disagree sharply on these boundaries: some (e.g., Kantian views) restrict morality to rational, interpersonal duties, while others (e.g., utilitarianism or virtue ethics) include self-regarding acts and non-human entities.

The framework I outline below is flexible and could, in principle, apply to any domain once individual values are specified. For simplicity, however, I focus primarily on interactions between humans. Importantly, while the model itself remains largely formal (describing how moral systems function), the substantive values one adopts are crucial to its application and outcomes; the arguments here do not presuppose particular values but can accommodate any of them.

Many people offer informal definitions of morality: it is what we ought to do, what constitutes 'doing the right thing', or a set of rules governing behaviour, take your pick. While dictionaries reflect ordinary usage and offer a helpful starting point, they lack the precision needed for philosophical analysis, as ordinary language often blurs descriptive, emotive, and prescriptive elements.

Google defines morality as 'principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour'[1]. The Cambridge Dictionary describes it as 'a set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character'[2]. Collins refers to it as “he belief that some behaviour is right and acceptable and that other behaviour is wrong'3]. Readers are welcome to consult other definitions, but they will find them broadly consistent.

The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy distinguishes two main senses of 'morality'.[4] In the descriptive sense, morality refers to codes of conduct actually put forward by a society or group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual as governing their own behaviour. These codes vary widely across cultures and individuals and must be distinguished from other normative systems (e.g. etiquette, law, or prudence) by features like seriousness, focus on harm or fairness, and lack of formal sanctions. In the normative sense (addressed later), morality refers to a code that would be endorsed by all rational persons under certain conditions (e.g. impartiality). Crucially, the descriptive sense allows for relativity and variation, while the normative sense often implies greater universality or objectivity.

None of these definitions, dictionary or SEP, builds objectivity or subjectivity directly into the concept of morality itself. The ontological question (whether moral facts exist independently, or are mind-dependent) is separate from the definitional one and remains hotly debated in metaethics. The text's earlier claim of complete irrelevance to ontology holds for purely descriptive definitions but becomes more complex when normative senses enter the picture.

In all cases, the concept centres on guiding behaviour, especially interactions that affect others.

From the Google definition, for instance, we see a distinction between good and bad behaviour: good behaviour is that which societies, groups, or individuals tend to encourage (e.g., via praise or norms), while bad behaviour is discouraged (e.g. via blame or disapproval). But why encourage or discourage at all? In simple terms: good behaviour advances shared or individual goals valued within the moral system (e.g., reducing harm, promoting cooperation), while bad behaviour hinders them.

This raises deeper questions, however. Any appeal to ‘moral goals’ must confront Hume's famous is-ought gap: one cannot logically derive prescriptive conclusions (‘ought’) solely from descriptive premises (‘is’) without additional normative bridging principles. Similarly, attempts to define moral ‘good’ in purely natural terms (e.g., pleasure, desire, or social utility) face G.E. Moore's open-question argument, which suggests that for any such reductive definition, it remains an open (meaningful) question whether the proposed property really is good, indicating that moral goodness may resist simple naturalistic analysis.

This brings us to the other end of the model.

Values and Goals

As human beings, each of us has things we value, things that are important to us. These will differ depending on background and experience but might include family, community, a sense of purpose, religion, and so on. To discover what a person truly values, we can ask them directly, though people are not always truthful (sometimes reporting what they think they ought to value). A more reliable method is to observe how they spend their time, energy, and resources. If someone claims their parents are very important but spends little time with them, that claim may not hold. What they do with their time, may not be the thing they actually value. Another simple question to ask is, what do they as result of doing what they do? In other words, values can sometime take a little teasing out.

In the context of morality, we call these moral values: they concern the things that matter to people in their interactions with others and the consequences of those interactions.

Examples might include, for a Christian, God’s will; for a Jew, the Torah or God’s laws; for an atheist, the well-being of humanity. Naturally, individuals will have more specific values under these broad headings. Other areas, such as animal welfare or the environment, can also influence morality, but we will set them aside here, the same principles apply.

Most of us do not stop at merely identifying what we value, we want to devote our time and effort efficiently and effectively. The next step is therefore to identify the goal(s) that support our values. A moral goal is the method or approach we use to implement or manifest those values, to make them real in the world. The best goals are achievable and measurable.

Using the earlier examples, a Christian’s moral goal might be 'to fulfil God’s will to the best of my ability,' while an atheist might say 'to maximise the well-being of other people and myself.' We can now see where behaviours fit into the model. A good behaviour is one that moves us towards our moral goal and should therefore be encouraged. A bad behaviour takes us away from it and should be discouraged. Good and bad behaviours are not chosen arbitrarily or on a whim; they are tied to the values we hold, which are normally deep-rooted and, unless shown otherwise, subjective.

Although values are ultimately held subjectively irrespective of their source, human values tend to converge significantly due to shared biology, evolutionary pressures favouring cooperation, and common social experiences. This convergence explains why certain moral intuitions (e.g. valuing well-being, fairness, and harm avoidance) are near-universal, even across cultures.

 Where Do Obligations Fit?

The short answer is: they do not, formally.

Many people view morality as defining what we ought or ought not to do. This is addressed in the Stanford Encyclopaedia’s second, normative definition [4]: a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be endorsed by all rational people.

Obligations often express a felt lack of choice about actions, using terms such as should, must, and have to. These are not formally part of the present model of morality, as they derive from a separate psychological construct that some people find useful for motivation. (For those who want more information on  this, obligations form part of a linguist structure called Model Operators of Necessity, from Neuro Linguistic Programming, see Structure of Magic [5], where a belief is held relating to a lack of choice concerning possible actions.)

When advantageous behaviours first evolved in cooperative communities, they would have been exhibited instinctively. As intellect developed, we became aware of these patterns and created models to explain them. Eventually, these became conceptualised as ‘obligations’ and incorporated into our broader belief systems for some people. For many, they became part of personal identity.

Theists, especially Christians, often claim that true moral obligations exist objectively and are issued by God. Until an objective source is demonstrated, we may treat obligations as useful mental motivators when a task feels compulsory, but without clear external authority when self-generated.

What Happens Next?

So far, we have presented a model of human behaviour and its effects on others, allowing us to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable actions. The obvious question is: so what?

One further clarification is needed. As noted earlier, morality is grounded in personal values, and is therefore fundamentally personal. Societies do not possess values or morality in the same literal sense that individuals do; they are collections of individuals whose values may overlap to varying degrees. What we commonly call “societal morality” is better described as widely shared moral norms or culture, ‘how things are done around here’. The same applies to companies, institutions, and families.

Many Christians argue that without God there can be no objective morality and thus no truly binding authority. As shown above, however, binding obligations are not required for morality to function effectively.

Consider an example: a community may decide that rape poses a serious threat. Members do not want women to experience it or to feel unsafe, especially at night; they do not want men to commit rape or for rape to become normalised. Consequently, they enact laws prohibiting the act, with severe penalties for violation.

Some might ask: if there is no objective right and wrong, should the rapist’s values also be accommodated? In most Western legal systems, the default position is that anything is permitted unless explicitly prohibited. Rape falls into the prohibited category. The rapist may find this inconvenient, but if they cannot accept the community’s rules, they must live elsewhere. The safety and freedom of women and girls takes precedence in the kind of society the majority wishes to create.

This is, in fact, how most Western societies operate.

Conclusion

The model presented here, demonstrates that morality is neither mysterious nor fragile. It is a practical, human framework, rooted in the values we hold dear, shaped into goals we pursue, and expressed through behaviours we encourage or discourage. Far from requiring transcendent grounding, this framework operates robustly in everyday life, undergirds shared cultural norms, and provides the foundation for ethical systems and laws in functioning secular societies.

We do not need objective moral values or divinely issued obligations for rape to be wrong, for compassion to be praiseworthy, or for cooperation to be rational. These judgments arise naturally from the values most humans share as social, interdependent beings. The frequent claim that “without God, there can be no real morality” mistakes a psychological desire for cosmic enforcement with a logical necessity. Morality exists and flourishes precisely because we care, deeply and consistently, about what happens to ourselves and to one another.

Thus, arguments like the Moral Argument for God’s existence, which premise the existence of objective moral values and duties as evidence for a divine source, fail at the outset. A fully coherent, powerful, and lived account of morality is available without any appeal to the supernatural. The burden remains firmly on those who insist that morality must be objective to provide evidence for that claim, evidence that, to date, has not been forthcoming.

Morality, in the end, is ours: human, fallible, evolving, and all the more precious for it.

Notes

1. Google - Morality

2. Cambridge Dictionary – Morality

3. Collins Dictionary - Morality

4. Stamford Encyclopedia - The Definition of Morality (02 & 25)

5. Model Operators p69 - Structure of Magic – Bandler and Grinder 1975

December 2025