Is Harm Always Wrong?

Is it always wrong to do harm? Is the definition of harm subjective? Causing harm is, in one sense, factual: you either diminish someone's well-being or you don’t. But context matters enormously, and so does intention. A surgeon or a dentist may cause temporary suffering while working on you, yet their usual purpose is to improve your bodily state or at least maintain it. By contrast, when an action or behaviour leaves someone in a state worse than before, diminishing their well-being, potential, or health without adequate justification, we normally describe it as doing harm and consider it morally wrong. The deeper question is whether this is always the case, or whether there are situations where causing harm can actually be a good thing.

By definition, good behaviours are those we need to encourage, while bad behaviours are the opposite, those we wish to discourage. But why bother making these distinctions at all? Morality isn't arbitrary; it emerges from our shared human needs for cooperation, survival, and social living. Evolutionary pressures and social structures push us to discourage behaviours that undermine group well-being and to encourage those that promote it. Without some framework for judging actions, societies couldn't function, so we bother because morality serves practical, deeply rooted purposes.

We all hold a set of values. They are nothing mysterious; they are simply the things we deem most important in life. How do you know what your values really are? Look at where you spend your time, energy, and resources, that reveals your true priorities. In the context of morality, moral values are those that guide how we behave toward others. For example, for many Christians, serving God is their highest value and often takes priority over family or community. For many atheists, the well-being of humans (themselves and others) ranks highest.

So how does this relate to good and bad behaviour? From our moral values, we derive a set of moral goals, that is, the outcomes we desire to achieve in order to put those values into practice. For the atheist in this example, a moral goal might be to maintain and enhance the well-being of ourselves and other humans. For the Christian or theist generally, a moral goal might be to fulfil God’s will (however they interpret that). A good behaviour, then, is one that brings you closer to that goal, while a bad behaviour leads you away from it.

This makes morality relative to one's values and goals, a form of moral relativism, but it is not arbitrary or "anything goes." Cross-cultural research in moral psychology (such as Moral Foundations Theory) shows striking convergence: nearly all societies prioritize minimizing gratuitous harm (the "care/harm" foundation), even as they differ on other concerns like loyalty, authority, or purity. This shared aversion to unnecessary suffering arises from our common biology and social needs, it explains why rape, murder, or torture are condemned almost universally, regardless of religious or secular frameworks. Extreme value systems that celebrate gratuitous harm (e.g., pure sadism) are rare and unstable because they undermine cooperation and survival; most people and cultures reject them for practical reasons.

Now we can see where harm fits in. For the atheist whose primary goal is human well-being, causing harm is generally not good. Rape is a clear example: it is widely agreed that it causes profound physical, mental, and emotional harm to the victim, making it a behaviour most societies wish to discourage and therefore consider bad.

However, in some religious frameworks, causing harm to certain outsiders (such as unbelievers) may not be merely neutral, it can even be viewed as good if it aligns with what the person believes their God commands or wills. This is often debated within theology itself: some divine command theorists (voluntarists) hold that good is whatever God wills, while others (influenced by natural law traditions) argue that God's commands reflect His inherently good nature, meaning God would not command gratuitous cruelty, as it contradicts divine goodness. Historical religious texts, including parts of the Old Testament, contain examples of divinely sanctioned violence or harm against enemies, but many modern interpreters see these as context-specific rather than timeless mandates. In modern times, certain extremist interpretations have justified harm toward perceived adversaries in the name of religious duty. Yet even here, most believers emphasize that true divine will align with broader principles of justice and mercy, not arbitrary harm.

In short, harm itself is neither good nor bad in isolation. It is simply a consequence of someone’s action or behaviour. What gives it moral weight, whether good or bad, is whether the behaviour that causes it helps achieve the actor’s moral goals. This view allows for justified harm in many contexts: a surgeon's incision, chemotherapy's side effects, or even self-defence that injures an attacker can be good because they advance well-being or protect life in the long run.

This goal-relative approach explains persistent moral disagreements without descending into nihilism. We can still critique systems for inconsistency (e.g., claiming to value human well-being while endorsing needless suffering) or promote dialogue to highlight shared priorities like harm minimization. Ultimately, recognizing that harm's moral status depends on values encourages humility, empathy, and reflection, rather than dogmatic absolutism.

November 2025