Atheism and Objective Moral Positions

Many atheists support some form of moral realism. This view is often grounded in evolution and the cooperative strategies that emerged in many species, particularly among higher mammals, as they competed for scarce resources. This article shows how a common misunderstanding of key terms in moral discussions leads to the unnecessary assumption that moral realism must be true.

Introduction

Theists typically argue that objective moral facts exist because of God’s existence and commands. While all atheists reject God’s role in grounding objective morality, not all deny that moral facts exist, many accept a form of moral realism.

Some atheists, especially philosophers, hold that certain behaviours are genuinely or intrinsically wrong. For most of these thinkers, this position stems from the way humans (and some other species) have evolved cooperative behaviours that confer evolutionary survival advantages. (Anthropologists widely accept this evolutionary pattern, though identifying the precise genetic mechanisms has proven challenging.)

From this, some conclude that because cooperative (and non-harmful) behaviours are an objective fact of the natural world, moral facts therefore exist. In other words, since causing harm is objectively observable, it is objectively wrong to cause it. Others frame the argument more semantically: “bad” and “wrong” are synonyms for immoral behaviour, immoral behaviour is defined as causing harm, harm is factually observable, and therefore such behaviour is objectively wrong by definition.

This article demonstrates that this conclusion rests on a misunderstanding of what morality actually entails.

Definitions

To advance the argument, a few key terms need clarification. While definitions vary and are often disputed, full consensus is not required here, these are used for clarity.

Morality

This argument relies on the definition most people intuitively accept: the principles concerning right and wrong behaviour. Most dictionaries offer similar formulations, and that is the sense used here. Immoral behaviours are those generally considered wrong or unacceptable; moral actions are those deemed good. What “right” and “wrong” mean will depend on context (see below).

Objective Fact

Something is an objective fact if it is true independently of human beliefs, thoughts, or feelings. Subjective positions, by contrast, are opinions or judgments that are neither true nor false, they simply reflect personal or cultural preferences (e.g., valuing certain things).

Harm

In the human context, harm is anything that shortens life or diminishes physical and/or mental capacities, preventing an individual from functioning at their full potential.

These definitions are not exhaustive, but they provide sufficient clarity to proceed.

Moral Realism

Before examining moral realism itself, consider the purpose of moral theories or models. Like scientific theories, they help us understand and navigate the world. Moral theories typically serve two roles:

1.       Descriptive: Referring to codes of conduct actually endorsed by a society, group (e.g., a religion), or individual. 

2.       Normative: Referring to codes that all rational agents, under specified conditions, would endorse as rules for members of a community or society.

Given the common-sense definition of morality above, moral realism requires that judgments of right and wrong behaviour hold objectively, not merely as subjective references. In other words, rape really is wrong, regardless of what anyone thinks.

Consider the act of rape as a case study:

1.       A person rapes another. Their own belief about the act’s rightness or wrongness is irrelevant here.

2.      The victim suffers physical, mental, or both forms of harm. By the definition above, this is an objective fact (though harm may not always be permanent). 

3.      Society judges the act as right or wrong.

The key question concerns points 2 and 3: Why is causing harm objectively wrong?

This question bridges the descriptive (harm occurs) and normative (we ought not cause harm). Subjectivity enters here, in our personal and cultural views of right and wrong.

We all hold subjective preferences: I like chocolate ice cream, Beethoven, and mountain landscapes. Chocolate may harm health (and thus should be avoided), but that is separate from the fact that I like it. Similarly, “the sun rises in the east” may start as an opinion, but it is objectively confirmable. Objective features of the world can be observed and verified by others; preferences, even widely shared ones, remain subjective.

Many people agree rape is wrong, often for shared reasons. When enough agree, societies legislate against it, impose punishments (meted out accordingly), and enforce norms. Yet none of this establishes that rape is objectively wrong. People subjectively view rape as undesirable, perhaps because it harms society long-term, threatens loved ones, or simply evokes empathy and compassion.

Morality and Evolution

The main reason some atheists defend objective morality without God is that morality is seen as an evolved trait: cooperative behaviours emerged in species, making them objectively real. Sam Harris, for example, argues morality concerns well-being, and once that is recognized, science can identify objectively better and worse ways to promote it. He attempts to bridge the classic is-ought gap (Hume) by claiming well-being's value is self-evident (like health or logical consistency), with gradients of conscious experience providing measurable, empirical facts about flourishing.

The problem here is equivocation on ‘morality,’ plus a lingering question-begging element. Morality itself did not evolve; certain adaptive behaviours evolved, which humans later labelled ‘moral’ to make sense of them. Harris assumes maximizing well-being is the obvious moral foundation without fully explaining why (beyond intuition), which critics argue still sneaks in an unproven ‘ought.’

Most species are solitary except for mating. Herding animals use ‘safety in numbers’, not true cooperation. Early social species like bees and termites, exhibit instinctive cooperation (largely because individuals are clones), but we do not consider them moral agents.

Among mammals, cooperation grows more complex. Arbitrary killing, theft, and rape are often shunned, with perpetrators ostracized and less likely to reproduce. Human ancestors likely followed similar patterns: groups with stronger cooperative behaviours (especially hunting) gained advantages. Language and care for the sick/elderly emerged alongside this. Individuals followed genetic inclinations; those who did survived and reproduced.

Today, we cognitively recognize these behaviours as beneficial to the species. But who cares? The universe? The planet? Evolution (which has no goals)? Other species? Only humans care, and strongly. We value well-being, cooperation, and care for others. These have become part of our shared subjective values and beliefs. We consider rape and murder wrong within the descriptive moral model we have constructed to explain these human attributes.

This subjectivist view also avoids a common worry for realists: if moral beliefs are shaped by evolution for survival (not truth-tracking), why think they correspond to objective moral facts? Subjectivism sidesteps this ‘debunking’ issue, no objective tracking is needed.

Cognitive Evolution

What distinguishes human morality from that of other mammals and primates? Around 70,000 years ago, humans underwent a cognitive revolution, developing imagination and symbolic thought (as described by Yuval Noah Harari in Sapiens). This enabled us to create models of the world, reflect on behaviour, and judge actions against our emotions, beliefs, and values, all held subjectively.

Normativity

The normative aspect of morality claims we ought not encourage harmful behaviours and should eliminate them as far as possible. We set goals (e.g., well-being) and strive toward them.

Some philosophers criticize moral subjectivism as unable to provide genuine normativity, no binding, categorical “oughts” that compel everyone, including dissenters. Why should psychopaths or cultural outliers follow shared values? And how does subjectivism resolve deep, intractable disagreement (e.g., over slavery or honour killings) if morality is just preference?

A reasonable response is that normativity can be hypothetical and pragmatic rather than absolute: “If you value a stable, flourishing society free from rape (as most humans do), then we ought to prohibit it.” Collective agreement allows us to enact laws, punish offenders, educate children, and reinforce norms in families, schools, and communities. This motivates behaviour effectively without requiring mind-independent facts. While not universally binding in a strong sense, it suffices for practical ethics and societal function.

Conclusion

Behaviours are right or wrong only according to our shared values and beliefs, views we hold subjectively, much like our preferences for certain foods or music. There is no compelling evidence that moral facts exist independently of the human mind, nor any necessity for them to do so. In fact, insisting on objective moral realism introduces unnecessary philosophical burdens: it must overcome the is-ought gap, explain why evolutionary adaptations track transcendent truths, and justify binding obligations that compel even those who reject them.

By contrast, a subjectivist framework is simpler, more honest, and fully adequate. It grounds morality in what actually moves us, our evolved capacity for empathy, cooperation, and reflection, while remaining flexible enough to adapt as new evidence, cultural shifts, and scientific understanding emerge. We can build robust moral systems, enforce laws, educate future generations, and promote human flourishing without invoking unprovable metaphysical entities. Morality does not need to be objective to be meaningful, binding in practice, or profoundly important. It is enough that we, as reasoning and caring beings, choose to value it, and act accordingly.

Notes

1. Stamford Encyclopaedia

2. Moral Landscape, Sam Harris, 2010

3. Sapiens - A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval Noah Harari, 2011 and 2014 in English

July 2018